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MOVING FORTH AND BACK IN TIME 
James Otten 
Clearly objects do move forth and back in space. 
Thus, for instance, Jackson walks from home to the 
corner drugstore and then walks back home. But do 
objects also move forth and back in time? And if not, 
would it be logically possible for them to do so? 
Indeed, what would even constitute a proper description 
of an object's moving forth and back in time? My aim 
in this paper is to answer these perplexing questions.1 
Richard Taylor has developed a procedure for con-
structing spatio-temporal analogies which enables us 
to find straightforward answers to these questions.2 
According to his procedure, in order to obtain a descrip-
tion of an obscure temporal notion, one first produces 
an exact description of the analogous spatial notion, 
and then one derives from that description, by substi-
tuting temporal for spatial terms and vice versa, a 
description of the temporal notion. Naturally this 
procedure will generate correct results only if space 
and time are radically similar to each other. For the 
purposes of this paper I shall assume that they are so. 
Now Taylor contends, on the basis of a spatio-temporal 
analogy which he develops, that objects do move forth and 
back in time, and that they do so in a certain uncon-
troversial manner. In this paper I shall, first of all, 
undermine Taylor's contention by showing that the analogy 
which he develops does not succeed in capturing the 
notion of an object moving forth and back. Secondly, I 
shall examine, and show to be unsuccessful, three other 
a t t e m p t s at constructing t h e correct analogy for the 
notion of an object moving forth and back. Each of 
these unsuccessful analogies, including Taylor's, is 
infected by one or the other of two mistakes: either 
(a) such an analogy gives a mistaken description of the 
spatial notion in question; or (b) it commits a procedural 
mistake in generating the temporal analogue (i.e. the 
description of the analogous temporal notion) from the 
description of the spatial notion. Finally, I shall 
state and defend the correct analogy which, it will be 
seen, involves the quite controversial notion of time-
travel . 
6 
Let us begin, then, by examining Taylor's analogy. 
He describes the fact that an object 0 moves forth and 
back in space in the following way: 
(IS) 0 is at placei both at timei and at 
time2- 0 endures from timei through 
time2- At time^ within the interval 
timei-time2 0 is" at places place^) . 
More precisely, this purportedly describes the fact that 
during the temporal interval timei-time2 an object 0 
moves from placei to place^ and then back again to place^, 
Rewriting this description"~according to the specified 
procedure, Taylor derives this temporal analogue: 
(IT) 0 is at timei both at placei and at 
place2• 0 extends from placei through 
place2• At place^ within the interval 
placei~place2 0 is" at time^ (i timei). 3 
Admittedly if description (IT) correctly depicts 
the notion of an object moving forth and back in time, 
then objects do move forth and back in time, and they 
do so in an uncontroversial manner. As an example of 
an object to which description (IT) applies, Taylor 
portrays an earthquake which at timei occurs "in two 
nearby towns , which we may refer to as placei and place2, 
and . . . it occurs everywhere between these two towns, 
but at one of those interna diate places at a time other 
than timei."1* 
However, description (IT) cannot be accepted as a 
correct description of the notion that an object moves 
forth and back in time since description (IS), from 
which it is derived, is incorrect. As Taylor himself 
implies, description (IS) constitutes an exact descrip-
tion of the relevant notion only if "any object 0 whose 
behavior fits that description is one that moves from 
its place and returns to it, and one that, therefore, 
can be described as 'moving forth and back in space.'"5 
Now some objects whose behavior description (IS) 
fits cannot be described as moving forth and back in 
space. Consider this example. Two towns, Middletown 
and Springfield, are situated one mile apart. Before 
noon on a c e r t a i n day Wilson parks his two-mile long 
train in such a way that it occupies the tracks both 
in Middletown and in Springfield, as well as the tracks 
in between the two towns, and he leaves it parked there 
throughout the afternoon. During the afternoon the 
train does not move from one town to the other and then 
back (it does not move at all), yet description (IS) 
a p p l i e s to this case. 
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So, description (IS) is not a correct description 
of the fact that an object moves forth and back in space. 
It must be concluded, therefore, that Taylor's analogy 
fails to capture the notion we want. 
Why is it, though, that Wilson's train cannot 
properly be described as moving forth and back between 
the two towns? What I shall call the part analogy 
provides an answer to this question which is based on 
the following observation. When an object moves forth 
and back in space, the whole object (i.e. all of its 
spatial parts) is in one place at one time, it is in a 
second place at a later time, and it is back in the 
first place at a still later time. Thus, according to 
the part analogy, Wilson's train cannot properly be 
described as moving forth and back between the two towns 
because the whole train did not occupy two different 
places during the afternoon, but rather the whole train 
remained in one place throughout the afternoon. Obviously 
the part analogy will be formulated in terms of spatial 
and temporal parts. 
According to the part analogy, the fact that an 
object 0 moves forth and back in space should be describ-
ed as follows: 
(2S) All of the spatial parts of 0 are at 
place^ both at time^ and at time2• 
All of the spatial parts of 0 endure 
from time^ through time2- At time^ 
within the interval timei~time2 air 
of the spatial parts of 0 are at place^ 
(i place-j^). — 
From this the part analogy obtains the following temporal 
analogue: 
(2T) All of the temporal parts of 0 are at time-j^  
both at place^ and at p l a c e s . All of the 
temporal parts of 0 extend from place^ 
through place2« At placej^ within the 
interval places-place2 all" of the temporal parts of 0 are at time k (/ time-^ . 
At first glance description (2S) seems to describe 
correctly the fact that an object moves forth and back in 
space. Shortly, though, we shall see that it does not 
correctly describe this fact. Let us first consider its 
temporal analogue, description (2T). According to this 
description, all of the temporal parts of an object exist 
at one time and these same temporal parts exist at 
another time. But this clearly is a logical impossi-
bility. 
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Suppose, for example, that, all of Anderson's 
temporal parts exist during the twentieth century. Now 
supposing that Anderson moves forth and back in time, 
as this is construed by the part analogy, then all of 
his temporal parts exist also at some time other than 
the twentieth century, say, during the sixteenth century. 
Of course, this is logically impossible. The identity 
of a temporal part is a function of the times through 
which it endures, so that if a temporal part exists at 
two different times, then at each of those times only 
some part of that temporal part exists. (Thus, if 
Johnson suffers from pneumonia in 19 70 and in 19 74, then 
the temporal part of Johnson, distinguished by the fact 
that during its endurance Johnson suffers from pneumonia, 
exists in 19 70 and 19 74; but in each of those years only 
a part of that temporal part exists.) So, if all of 
Anderson's temporal parts exist in the sixteenth and 
twentieth centuries, as is implied by the supposition 
that all exist in each of those centuries, then during 
each of those centuries only some (i.e. not all) of his 
temporal parts exist. But this contradicts the supposi-
tion that during each century all of his temporal parts 
exist. Therefore, it must be concluded that description 
(2T) describes a logical impossibility. 
Returning now to description (2S), it can be seen 
on a closer inspection that this description does not 
correctly describe the fact that an object moves forth 
and back in space, but rather it describes, as its 
temporal analogue does, a logical impossibility. The 
part analogy, because it divides objects into spatial 
and temporal parts, requires that objects be viewed as 
four-dimensional entities—as entities with three spatial 
dimensions and one temporal dimension. Hence each 
spatial part and each temporal part of an object is 
itself a four-dimensional entity. 
Notice that since description (2T) asserts that all 
of the temporal parts of an object exist at two different 
times, it therefore implies that all of the spatial parts 
of that object exist at those two times. Similarly, but 
perhaps not so obviously at first glance, since descrip-
tion (2S) asserts that all of the spatial parts of an 
object exist at two different times, it therefore implies 
that all of the temporal parts of that object exist at 
each of those two times. Yet, as shown above, it is 
logically impossible for all of the temporal parts of an 
object to exist at each of two different times. 
I conclude, then, that description (2S) portrays a 
logical impossibility and thus cannot be the correct 
description of the fact that an object moves forth and 
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back in space- So, the part analogy fails to capture 
the notion of moving forth and back. 
The observation underlying the part analogy seems 
plausible enough: When an object moves forth and back 
in space, the whole object occupies different places at 
different times. This is plausible, though, only if 
objects are regarded as changing three-dimensional 
entities , as entities which can be divided into spatial 
parts but not into temporal parts. But, of course , the 
terminology of spatial and temporal parts demands that 
objects be regarded as unchanging four-dimensional 
entities. What we are doing, in formulating our spatio-
temporal analogy in terms of spatial and temporal parts , 
is translating a three-dimensional notion—the notion of 
moving forth and back--into the four-dimensional idiom. 
In order to represent this notion accurately, the 
translation must be complete.6 
What I shall call the four-dimension analogy pro-
vides such, a complete translation" This analogy recon-
strues the observation underlying the part analogy in 
the following way: When an object moves forth and back 
in space, one temporal part of the object exists in one 
place at one time, another temporal part exists in a 
second place at a later time, and yet another temporal 
part exists in the first place at a still later time. 
So, according to the four-dimension analogy, the 
fact that an object 0_ moves forth and back in space can 
be exactly described as follows: 
(3S) Temporal-parti of 0 is at placei at timei-
Temporal-part2 of 0 is at placei at 
time2« The series of temporal-parts 
of 0 from temporal-parti through 
temporal-part2 fills the i n t e r v a l 
time^-time^. At time k within the interval timei-timeo Temporal-part^ 
of 0 is at place^ (y place-^). — 
Rewriting, the four-dimension analogy derives this temporal 
analogue: 
(3T) Spatial-part-^ of 0 is at placei at timei-
Spatial-part2 of 0 is at place2 at time-p 
The series of spatial-parts of 0 from 
spatial-parti through spatial-part2 
fills the interval place^-place2• At 
place^ within the interval placei~place2 
spatiarl-part^ of 0_ is at time^ timei). 
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Now description (3S) does constitute an exact 
description of the fact that an object moves forth and 
back in space. However, description (3T) is not the 
appropriate temporal analogue, for some procedural 
mistake has occurred in generating description (3T) 
from description (3S). I shall show later precisely 
what this mistake is. First, though, I want to examine 
an analogy which is closely similar to the four-
dimension analogy. 
What I shall refer to as the event analogy takes 
description (3S) to be the correct description of the 
fact that an object moves forth and back in space, but 
the temporal analogue which it generates from this 
description is quite different from the temporal 
analogue of the four-dimension analogy. This difference 
is due to an assumption which the event analogy makes, 
but which the four-dimension analogy does not make, 
about the construction of spatio-temporal analogies. 
According to this assumption, when constructing a 
spatio-temporal analogy one must replace in the descrip-
tion of the spatial fact all spatial terms by temporal 
ones and all temporal terms by spatial ones.' 
As Taylor correctly remarks, "object" is a spatial 
term and "event" is the temporal term corresponding to 
it.8 Taking this into consideration, the event analogy 
maintains that the following description is the appropri-
ate temporal analogue to description (3S): 
(4T) Spatial-parti of event E is at place^ 
at time]_. Spatial-part2 of E is at 
place2 at time^. The series of spatial-
parts of E from spatial-part^ through 
spatial-part2 fills the interval place^-
place2« At place^ within the interval 
placei-place2 spafial-partk of E is at 
timefc timei). 
Now it is plainly absurd to suppose that description 
(4T) presents us with a description of the notion that an 
object moves forth and back in time. Rather, what it 
presents us with is, at best, a description of the notion 
that an event moves forth and back in time. In short, it 
does not give us what we want. Where the event analogy 
goes wrong is in its assumption that in the construction 
of a spatio-temporal analogy one must replace in the 
description of the spatial fact all spatial terms by 
temporal ones and all temporal terms by spatial ones. 
Consider for a moment the following statement: 
(S) An object moves forth and back in space 
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One can derive seven different temporal analogues for 
this statement by distinguishing the following seven 
"replacement-versions" (only the underlined terms in a 
replacement-version are subject to replacement by the 
analogous spatial or temporal terms in the construction 
of a spatio-temporal analogy): 
(a) An ob j e ct moves forth and back in space. 
(b) An object moves forth and back in space. 
(c) An object moves forth and back in space. 
(d) An object moves forth and back in space 
(e) An object moves forth and back in space. 
(f) An object moves forth and back in space. 
(g) An object moves forth and back in space, 
Obviously the spatio-temporal analogy which we are 
attempting to construct is based on replacement-version 
(a) , for we want to know what it is like for an object 
to move forth and back in time, rather than in space. 
But the event analogy is based on replacement-version 
(g). 9 I conclude, then, that the event analogy fails 
to capture the notion we want. Its failure lies in the 
procedural mistake which it makes by virtue of using an 
incorrect replacement-version in deriving the temporal 
analogue. 
Now I want to return to the four-dimension analogy 
in order to expose the procedural mistake which is in-
volved in it. This mistake, like the one involved in 
the event analogy, is due to its using an incorrect 
replacement-version in deriving the temporal analogue. 
Exposing this mistake requires that we first examine 
two contrasting views concerning change and movement. 
I shall call these the temporalist and the spatio-
temporalist views. 
According to the temporalist view, the notion of 
change is an essentially temporal notion. Temporalists 
maintain that change can occur only over an extent of 
time. Nelson Goodman, for instance, says that "change 
is concomitant variation in time and some other respect 
Since time is always one of the variant factors in 
change, we speak of change in whatever is the other 
variant factor in the given case."l° Let us say that 
the temporalist notion of change is the notion of 
temporal change. So, an object undergoes temporal chan 
with respect to a property just in case its temporal 
parts differ with respect to that property. 
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On the other hand, according to the spatio-
temporalist view, our notion of change is not an 
essentially temporal notion. Spatio-temporalists con-
tend that besides the notion of temporal change there 
is also a notion of spatial change. Thus, Taylor says 
that "something, such as a wire, might be blue at one 
end and red at the other, and perhaps various other 
colors between these two places. This would accordingly 
be an example of spatial change."I1 An object under-
goes spatial change with respect to a property, then, 
just in case its spatial parts differ with respect to 
that property. 
Movement, of course, is a kind of change. To say 
that an object moves in a frame of reference (e.g. space 
or time) is just to say that it changes its position in 
that frame of reference. Using the two notions of 
change, we can distinguish two notions of moving forth 
and back: to say that an object moves temporally forth 
and back in a frame of reference is just to say that it 
undergoes temporal change forth and back in its position 
in that frame of reference; and to say that an object 
moves spatially forth and back in a frame of reference 
is just to say that it undergoes spatial change forth 
and back in its position in that frame of reference. 
Furthermore, since the frame of reference may be space 
or time, we can distinguish the following notions of 
moving forth and back: 
(1) An object moves temporally forth and back 
in space. 
(2) An object moves temporally forth and back 
in time. 
(3) An object moves spatially forth and back 
in s p a c e . 
(4) An object moves spatially forth and back 
in time. 
Temporalists would maintain, of course, that notions 
(3) and (4) are not legitimate notions of moving forth 
and back since they presuppose the notion of spatial 
change. At any rate, it is not necessary for us to 
settle the dispute between the temporalists and the 
spatio-temporalists. Which view is the correct one does 
not have a direct bearing on which analogy is the appro-
priate spatio-temporal analogy. Yet this dispute does 
h e l p us to see what the appropriate analogy is. 
Recall that the sense of moving forth and back in 
space in which we are interested is expressed by notion 
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(1). Thus, when Jackson walks from home to the corner 
drugstore and then back home again, he is moving 
temporally forth and back in his position in space; 
that is, he is moving temporally from one spatial 
position to another and back to the first position. 
Now as remarked earlier, our spatio-temporal analogy 
should be based on this replacement-version: 
(a) An object moves forth and back in space. 
Or, more precisely, it should be based on the following 
replacement-version: 
(a 1) An object moves temporally forth and back 
in space. 
It follows from this that the temporal analogue which 
we generate should be a description of notion (2). 
We are at last in a position to see what is wrong 
with the four-dimension analogy. Description (3T) of 
the four-dimension analogy is a description not of 
notion (2), but rather of notion (4). Description (3T) 
speaks of spatial-parts being at places, whereas the 
correct temporal analogue should instead speak of 
temporal-parts being at times. It must be concluded, 
therefore, that the four-dimension analogy does not 
capture the notion of moving forth and back in which 
we are interested. 
What I shall call the time-travel analogy does cap-
ture this notion. This analogy is constituted by 
description (3S) and the following temporal analogue 
to it: 
(5T) Temporal-parti of 0 is at timei at time^. 
Temporal-part2 of 0 is at txme~ at time 2 . The series of temporal-parts oT 0 from 
temporal-parti through temporal-part2 
fills the interval time-^-time2 • At 
timej^ within the interval timei-time2 temporal-part^ of 0 is at time^ 
(i time) . "* ~~ 
At this point , assuming that only one temporal 
frame of reference is being referred to in description 
(5T), it is tempting to conclude the notion of moving 
forth and back in time is in part contradictory and in 
part meaningless. To see why this is so, consider the 
following example to which description (5T) applies. 
Let us distinguish three of Anderson's temporal-parts: 
his 19 76-temporal-part endures only throughout 19 76, 
his 197 7-temporal-part endures only throughout 19 77, 
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and his 1978-temporal-part endures only throughout 19 78. 
Moreover, let us assume that description (5T) applies 
to Anderson in this way: his 1976-temporal-part is in 
19 76 in 1976; his 197 8-temporal-part is in 19 76 in 19 78; 
the series of his temporal-parts from his 1976-temporal-
Dart through his 197 8-temporal-part fills.the interval 
1976-1978; in 19 77, within the interval 19 76-1978, 
Anderson's 197 7-temporal-part is in 1977 (i 1976). 
Now what is so troublesome about this case is that 
Anderson's 197 8-temporal-part is in 19 76 in 19 78. Given 
the way in which we defined Anderson's 1978-temporal-
part , it is contradictory to say that his 1978-temporal-
part is in 1976. And it is meaningless to say that some-
thing is in 19 76 in 19 78. Indeed, if all of the times 
mentioned in description (5T) refer to the same temporal 
frame of reference, then it must be concluded that the 
notion of moving forth and back in time is in part 
contradictory and in part meaningless. 
But we need not assume that all of the times 
mentioned in description (5T) refer to the same temporal, 
frame of reference. In fact, since description (5T) 
portrays the notion of an object moving temporally forth 
and back in time, it is quite natural to assume that two 
temporal frames of reference are involved: an objective 
frame of reference, to which the italicized temporal 
expressions in description (5T) refer, constituted by 
the time-lines of those objects which, so to speak, move 
equably forth through time; and a proper frame of 
reference, to which those temporal expressions not 
italicized in description (5T) refer, constituted by the 
time-lines of the object 0.12 
When description (5T) is construed in this way, as 
referring to an objective and a proper frame of reference, 
the n o t i o n of moving forth and back in time no longer 
seems either contradictory o r meaningless. To see this, 
consider the following example to which description C5T), 
as now construed, applies. Let us distinguish three of 
Thompson's temporal-parts: his thirtieth-temporal-part 
endures only throughout the thirtieth year of his life*, 
his thirty-first-temporal-part endures only throughout 
the thirty-first year of his life; and his thirty-
second-temporal-part endures only throughout the thirty-
second year of his l i f e . We can assume that description 
(5T) applies to Thompson in this manner: his thirtieth-
temporal-part is wholly within 19 76 in the thirtieth 
year of his life; his thirty-second-temporal-part is 
wholly within 19 76 in the thirty-second year of his 
l i f e ; the series of his temporal-parts from his thirtieth-
temporal-part through his thirty-second-temporal-part 
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fills the interval between the thirtieth and thirty-
second years of his life; in the thirty-first year of 
his life, within the interval between his thirtieth and 
his thirty-second years, Thompson's thirty-first-
temporal-part is wholly within 19 77 (5^1976). 
What is disturbing about this case is that each of 
two separate temporal parts of Thompson supposedly occupy 
the whole of 1976, and if this were the case some dis-
turbing things conceivably might happen—for instance, 
the older Thompson conceivably might kill the younger 
Thompson. At any rate, however disturbing it may be 
to assert that each of two different temporal-parts of 
an object occupy the whole of one and the same time, 
clearly it is neither contradictory nor meaningless. 1 3 
Naturally it would be contradictory to assert that 
Thompson's thirtieth-temporal-part occupies the whole 
of 19 76 wholly within one place and that his same 
temporal-part occupies the whole of 19 76 wholly within 
a separate place; and it would be meaningless to assert 
that Thompson's thirtieth-temporal-part is in 19 76 in 
19 77. But these kinds of situations are not envisioned 
in this example, and they do not fall under description 
(5T) as it is now construed. 
I conclude, then, that description (5T), as con-
strued with two temporal frames of reference, correctly 
describes the notion of moving forth and back in time, 
and that it is logically possible for objects to move 
forth and back in time. It is an incontestable fact, 
of course, that objects do not move forth and back in 
time, for we simply never observe objects behaving in 
such a way that description (5T) can properly be applied 
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NOTES 
xThe notion of moving forth and back should be 
understood not as the notion of moving forward and then 
backward, but rather as the notion of moving from one 
position to another and then back again. So, if Wilson 
were to back away from a lion, pick up his gun, and then 
move forward to where he first stood, this would count 
as moving forth and back in space. 
Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, second edition 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), 
pp. 75-77. He also develops this procedure in two 
articles: "Moving About in Time," The Philosophical 
Quarterly, IX (1959), pp. 289-301-, and "Spatial and 
Temporal Analogies and the Concept of Identity," The 
Journal of Philosophy, LII (1955), pp. 599-612. The 
latter article is reprinted in J. J. C. Smart, ed., 
Problems of Space and Time (New York: Macmillan, 1964) , 
pp. 381-96; my page references are to the Smart volume. 
3 
See Metaphysics, p. 76. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
g 
J. J. C. Smart makes this point in his article 
"Spatializing Time ?" Mind, LXIV (1955), pp. 239-41; this is reprinted in Richard M. Gale, ed., The Philosophy 
of Time (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 163-
67. Smart writes: "What we must be careful to avoid, 
however, is mixing our terminologies, and talking of 
enduring, changing, and not changing, in the context 
of our four-dimensional representation" (p. 166). 
7 . . 
Taylor does not explicitly endorse this assumption, 
but it seems that he is implicitly committed to it. For 
a discussion of this, see J. W. Meiland, "Temporal Parts 
and Spatio-Temporal Analogies," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 3 (1966), p. 66. 
g 
After mentioning this distinction between "object" 
and " e v e n t ,"• Taylor sloughs over it, saying, "no such 
distinction is necessary and none will be made here" 
("Spatial and Temporal Analogies," p. 381). So, for 
Taylor even events are "objects." Interestingly enough, 
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the examples which he gives of "objects" which move 
forth and back in time are events, whereas the examples 
which he gives of "objects" which move forth and back in 
space are what we ordinarily call objects. At any rate, 
I am concerned with the notion of an object (which is 
not an event) moving forth and back. 
9 
Later it shall become evident that the event 
analogy is based on replacement-version (g) rather than 
replacement-version (e). 
^Nelson Goodman, The S t r u c t u r e of A p p e a r a n c e , 
second edition (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 19 66) , p. 374. 
1:LMetaphysics, p. 78. 
12 
For an excellent discussion of the distinction 
between objective and proper times, see John G. Graves 
and James E. Roper, "Measuring Measuring Rods," Philosophy 
of Science, 32 (1965) , pp. 39-55 , esp. p. 42. 
13 
Paul Horwich provides a convincing rebuttal of 
some standard arguments against time-travel (and hence 
against the notion of moving forth and back in time) in 
his paper "On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel," 
The Journal of Philosophy, LXXII (1975), pp. 432-44. 
14 
I have defended the view that objects move forth 
through time in a paper entitled "The Passage of Time," 
in Richard Taylor, ed., Readings in Metaphysics, 
forthcoming. 
